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Value versus Growth International Real Estate Investment  
 
Abstract 
 
We use office and retail properties return data for US and some Asia Pacific cities to ascertain 
the relative performance of value and growth investment strategies. The results reveal that value 
portfolios outperform growth portfolios. Furthermore, while the results show that risk varies over 
time, time-varying risk analyses generally do not support the risk-based explanation for the value 
premium. Similarly, conditional market regressions do not explain the value premium anomaly as 
all the alphas are positive and significant. Moreover, the results imply that na¨ıve extrapolation of 
past performance could be a credible explanation for the value premium. 
 
KEYWORDS: Value investment strategy, value properties, growth properties, beta premium, 
beta premium sensitivity, value premium. 
 
Introduction 
The choice of an investment strategy is an important step in the decision-making process of fund 
managers and large institutional investors. In view of this, growth stock investment strategy and 
value stock investment strategy have received considerable attention in the finance literature. The 
growth stock investment strategy is frequently associated with investments in glamour stocks that 
have relatively high price-to-earnings ratios (i.e. high gross income multiplier in real estate 
terms). On the other hand, value stock investment strategy usually involves investing in stocks 
that have recently experienced low or negative growth rates in corporate earnings. Thus, they 
characteristically have relatively low market price in relation to earnings per share (EPS), cash 
flow per share, book value per share, or dividend per share (i.e. low gross income multiplier).  
Notwithstanding their past abysmal performance, studies show that investments in value stocks 
outperform growth stocks in major markets (see for example, Fama and French 1993, 1995, 1996, 
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1998], Capual et al. 1993; Lakonishok et al. 1994; Haugen 1995; Arshanapali et al. 1998; Levis 
and Liodakis 2001; Badrinath and Omesh 2001; and Chan and Lakonishok 2004).  
 
Although studies such as Jones (1993) and Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) do not support the 
relative superiority of value investments, the finance academic fraternity virtually agrees that 
value investment strategies generally outperform growth investment strategies.  
 
The main debate about value investment strategy centers on the rationale for the value 
superiority. Several explanations including the risk-based theory and the behavioral finance 
paradigm have been given for the value premium (i.e. positive value-minus-growth) anomaly. 
The risk-based school of thought (e.g. Fama and French 1993, 1995, 1996; Campbell and 
Vuolteenaho, 2004; Li et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2009 and Campbell et al., 2010) argues that the 
value premium is a function of risk.  According to Petkova and Zhang (2005), value/growth betas 
covary positively/negatively with the expected market risk premium. Thus, value-minus-growth 
betas tend to covary positively with the expected market risk premium. Acceptance of the risk-
based hypothesis implies that the value strategy has nothing spectacular to offer investors while a 
rejection of it implies that investors stand to gain by adopting the value strategy.   
 
Moreover, the behavioral finance group argues that value strategies are not fundamentally riskier 
than growth strategies. Value strategies rather exploit the suboptimal behavior of the typical 
investor to provide higher returns than growth strategies (see for example, Lo and MacKinlay, 
1990; Lakonishok et al. 1994; La Porta et al. 1997). As stated by Dorsey (2004: v), “the history 
of markets is the history of human error”. While Dorsey’s (2004) statement may somewhat be an 
exaggeration, it should be noted that market price, being a product of the judgments of fallen 
men, may not always be accurate – Fallibility is embedded in almost every action of mankind. As 
observed by Clendenin (1955:30): “it is not to be expected that market prices, which reflect the 
current judgments of fallible men, will at all times show accurate appraisals of investment assets. 
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Market prices are often slow and erratic in arriving at logical levels, but they are forever 
searching for them”. Similarly, Friday (1922:203) states that “the market, with its scale of prices, 
does not always give the information which is needed as a basis for rational economic conduct…” 
These statements are in harmony with Rubin (2000:56): “But everything I have experienced 
suggests that, at core, economic conditions and markets are grounded in the human psyche. That 
is, confidence or the lack thereof, profoundly affects markets and economies, and confidence in 
turn, has throughout history of markets and economies tended to swing from excesses in one 
direction to excesses in the other”. Thus, so far as there are investors in the market who exhibit 
suboptimal behavior, and human beings are prone to error, value investment strategists can 
exploit these market inefficiencies to earn a value premium which may not be a compensation for 
risk.   
 
The extant literature on the value premium predominantly relates to equities. We apply the 
value/growth investment strategies to a different asset class, real estate, to explore the provenance 
of the value premium (if any) in real estate investment. Therefore, the objectives of the study are: 
i) to ascertain the comparative advantage(s), in terms of performance, of value real estate 
investment;  
ii) to ascertain whether value real estate investment premium, if any, is a function of risk; 
iii) to establish whether excessive extrapolation and expectational errors characterize value and 
growth property investment strategies. 
 
We find that the value strategies generally outperform the growth strategies. Furthermore, the 
results do not support the risk-based hypothesis. In other words, the superior performance of the 
value portfolios is not necessarily a compensation for risk. In contrast, the evidence suggests that 
naïve extrapolation of past performance and expectational errors are a credible explanation for the 
value premium. 
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There are a few reasons why the results support the behavioral rather than the risk-based view. 
The direct property market is known to be imperfect due to, among other things, heterogeneity of 
the asset, illiquidity, lumpiness, fixity in location, inelastic supply and the presence of relatively 
uninformed market participants. Kinnard, Jr. (1971:11) states that as a result of the imperfection 
of the property market, “price and value are not synonymous and are infrequently equal” (see also 
Bennet, 2000). According to Baum et al. (1996:40) “…dealers in frequently traded equities are 
price takers whereas property dealers… are price makers, albeit they may make the wrong price”. 
Moreover, the impossibility of short selling and illiquidity of real estate make arbitraging in the 
direct property market prohibitively expensive if not impossible (see Phalippou, 2007; Shleifer, 
2000; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; De Long et al., 1990; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2000). The 
end result of all these is the high probability of mispricing especially in view of the presence of 
individual investors who are relatively uninformed (see Phalippou, 2007; Baum et al., 1996). In 
addition, one of the bases for the risk-based explanation, Cash Flows (Campbell, 1993, 1996; 
Campbell and Vuolteenaho, 2004) may not be as problematic for real property as they are for 
equities – real property cash flows, as proxied by rent which is contractual, are relatively certain 
over a lease period to negate the risk-based explanation premised on cash flows. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the finance 
literature on the value investment strategy after which, a set of research hypotheses are 
formulated. This is followed by a discussion on data sourcing and management, and the value 
strategy model. The next section is devoted to the empirical model estimation which is followed 
by a post-model estimation. The last section deals with concluding remarks. 
 
Literature Review 
According to Dreman (1982) a contrarian investor is an investor who goes against the “grain”. 
Thus, contrarian investment strategy simply refers to investment in securities which have lost 
favor with investors. It covers various investment strategies based on buying/selling stocks that 
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are priced low/high relative to accounting measures of performance – earnings-to-price ratios 
(E/P), cash flow-to-price ratio (C/P) and book value-to-price ratio (B/P) – as well as strategies 
based on low/high measures of earning per share (EPS) growth (Capual 1993). In simple terms, 
the contrarian investment strategy refers to the value/growth stock paradigm. 
 
While there is substantial empirical evidence supporting the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
that security prices provide unbiased estimates of the underlying values, many researchers 
question the validity of EMH. Smidt (1968) argues that one potential source of market 
inefficiency is inappropriate market response to information. The inappropriate response to 
information implicit in Price-Earnings (P/E) ratios may be an indicator of future investment 
performance of a security. Proponents of this price-ratio hypothesis claim that low P/E securities 
tend to outperform high P/E stocks (Williamson, 1970). Basu (1977), Jaffe et al. (1989), Fama 
and French (1992, 1998), Davis (1994), Lakonishok et al. (1994), Bauman et al. (1998), 
Badrinath and Omesh (2001) and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) show a positive relationship 
between earnings yield and equity returns. However, as a result of the noisy nature of earnings 
(i.e. the category of stocks with low E/P include also stocks that temporarily have depressed 
earnings), value strategies based on E/P give narrower spreads than other simple value strategies 
(Chan and Lakonishok 2004). Furthermore, in view of the noise in reported earnings that result 
from Japanese accounting standards (i.e. distortions in the earnings induced by accelerated 
depreciation allowances), Chan et al. (1991) do not find evidence of a strong positive earnings 
yield effect after controlling for the other fundamental variables.  
 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) show that stocks with high Book Value relative to Market Value of 
equity (BV/MV) outperform the market. Further studies, e.g. Chan et al. (1991) and Fama and 
French (1992), confirm and extend these results. In view of the highly influential paper by Fama 
and French (1992), academics (e.g. Capaul et al. 1993; Davis 1994; Lakonishok et al. 1994; La 
Porta et al. 1997; Fama and French 1998; Bauman et al. 1998 and 2001; Chan et al. 2000; and 
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Chan and Lakonishok 2004) have shifted their attention to the ratio of BV/MV as one of the 
leading explanatory variables for the cross-section of average stock returns.  
 
Although BV/MV has gained much credence as an indicator of value-growth orientation, it is by 
no means an ideal measure (Chan and Lakonishok 2004). BV/MV is not a ‘clean’ variable 
uniquely associated with economically interpretable characteristics of the firm (Lakonishok et al. 
1994) as many different factors are reflected in this ratio. For example, low BV/MV may describe 
a company with several intangible assets that are not reflected in accounting book value. A low 
BV/MV can also describe a company with attractive growth opportunities that do not enter the 
computation of book value but do enter the market price. A stock whose risk is low and future 
cash flows are discounted at a low rate would have a low BV/MV as well. Finally, a low BV/MV 
may be reminiscent of an overvalued glamour stock.  
The shortcomings of accounting earnings have motivated a number of researchers to explore the 
relationship between cash flow yields and stock returns. High Cash Flow to Price (CF/P) stocks 
are identified as value stocks because their prices are low per dollar of cash flow, or the growth 
rate of their cash flows is expected to be low. Chan et al. (1991), Davis (1994), Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), Bauman et al. (1998), Fama and French (1998), and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) show 
that a high ratio of CF/P predicts higher returns. This is consistent with the idea that measuring 
the market’s expectations of future growth more directly gives rise to better value strategies (La 
Porta 1996).  
 
Fama and French (1998) and Bauman et al. (1998) use the ratio of Dividends to Price (D/P) as a 
proxy for the market’s expectation of future growth. Firms with higher ratios have lower expected 
growth and are considered to be value stocks. They show that the performance of the value stocks 
based on dividend yields is quantitatively similar to the performance based on the foregoing 
categorizations (i.e. P/E, BV/MV and CF/P). Finally, instead of using expectations of future 
growth to operationalize the notions of glamour and value, Davis (1994) and Lakonishok et al. 
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(1994) use past growth to classify stocks. Davis (1994) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) use Growth 
in Sales (GS) as a proxy for past growth to conclude that the spread in abnormal returns is 
sizeable.  
 
Since the different valuation indicators of value-growth orientation are not highly correlated, a 
strategy based on information from several valuation measures may enhance portfolio 
performance. Lakonishok et al. (1994) explore sophisticated two-dimensional versions of simple 
value strategies. According to the two-way classification, value stocks are defined as those that 
have shown poor growth in sales, earnings and cash flow in the past, and are expected by the 
market to maintain such poor performance in the future. Expected performance is measured by 
multiples of price to current earnings and cash flow. La Porta et al. (1997) form portfolios on the 
basis of a two-way classification based on past GS and CF/P introduced by Lakonishok et al. 
(1994). Using robust regression methods, Chan and Lakonishok (2004) estimate cross-sectional 
models that predict future yearly returns from beginning-year values of the BV/MV, CF/P, E/P 
and the sales to price ratios. The use of the multiple measures in the composite indicators 
enhances the performance of the value strategy (see Gregory et al. 2003).  
 
In contrast to the above findings, Jones (1993) reports that the profitability of value portfolios is a 
pre-WW II phenomenon that has since largely disappeared. However, this has been refuted by 
later studies which include post-war data.  Also, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) suggest that 
positive profits resulting from the use of the value investment strategy are limited to the U.S. 
stock market. When applied to the Canadian stock market, the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) model 
does not produce favorable results. Instead of finding significant price reversals, Kryzanowski 
and Zhang (1992) find that the Canadian stock market exhibits significant price continuation 
behavior, which does not support the value investment strategy. This is also refuted by later 
studies that conclude mean-reversion tendency (see for example, Bauman and Miller 1997). 
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In view of the accumulated weight of the evidence from past studies, the finance academic 
fraternity agrees that value investment strategies generally outperform growth investment 
strategies. The only polemical issue about the value investment strategy is the rationale for its 
superior performance. 
 
Rationale for Superior Performance of Value Strategies 
 Competing explanations for the superior performance of the value strategy include risk 
premiums (Fama and French 1993, 1995, 1996), systematic errors in investors’ expectations and 
analysts’ forecasts – i.e. naïve investor expectations of future growth and research design induced 
bias (see for example, La Porta et al. 1997; Bauman & Miller 1997; La Porta 1996; Dechow & 
Sloan 1997; Lakonishok et al. 1994; Lo and MacKinlay 1990; Kothari et al. 1995) and the 
existence of market frictions (Amihud and Mendelson 1986) .The traditional school of thought, 
led by Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), argues that the superior performance is a function of 
value investment being relatively risky. This school of thought contends that the expected risk 
premium for the value strategy is higher/lower during bad/good economic times as value-firms 
are more susceptible to financial distress. Thus, value premium is attributed to time-varying risk 
(see Chan 1988; Ball and Kothari 1989; Kothari and Shanken 1992; Lettau and Wachter, 2007). 
Petkova and Zhang (2005) argue that previous studies that contradict the risk-based hypothesis 
use realized market return (a noisy measure of economic conditions) to measure aggregate 
economic conditions (see Fama, 1981; and Stock and Watson, 1999). Using more precise 
measures of aggregate economic conditions (i.e. default spread, the term spread and the short 
term interest rate), Petkova and Zhang (2005) find that the conditional betas for value stocks 
covary positively with the expected market risk premium, while growth stocks’ conditional betas 
covary negatively. Furthermore, Petkova and Zhang (2005) find that positive beta-premium 
sensitivity of value firms is more significant during periods of depression (see also Lettau and 
Wachter, 2007; Gomes et al., 2003; Dechow et al., 2004). These findings concur with Guo et al. 
(2005) that value stocks carry higher time-varying risk. Moreover, Petkova and Zhang (2005) 
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state that the positive correlation between ex post and ex ante market returns could have led to the 
classification of good states ex post as bad states ex ante and vice versa to underpin the contrary 
findings of studies that cast doubt on the risk-based hypothesis. 
 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) and Zhang (2005) argue that value is riskier than growth 
particularly in bad times when the price of risk is high (also see Cornell, 199). Similarly Black 
and Fraser (2004) find a negative correlation between the value premium and real GDP in the US 
to conclude that the value premium is a reward for risk during financial distress. It must be noted, 
however, that the width of the value spread may not be necessarily indicative of risk – it is simply 
value minus growth. In addition, negative correlation with GDP and positive beta-premium 
sensitivity of value firms may be attributable to the asymmetric effect of positive and negative 
earnings surprises on value and growth stocks (Bauman and Miller, 1997; Dreman and Berry, 
1995; and Levis and Liodakis, 2001). Negative surprises have been found to have a relatively 
benign effect on value stocks. This implies that while growth stocks may perform far better than 
value stocks in good times to narrow the value spread, they perform considerably worse than 
value stocks in bad times to increase the value spread as value stocks are relatively more resistant 
to bad news than growth stocks. Thus, negative correlation to GDP and positive value beta-
premium sensitivity may not be conclusively probative of the value premium being a 
compensation for time varying risk. 
 
In contrast to Brenan et al. (2001, 2004) who document that value stocks have higher Sharpe 
Ratios and lower cash flow betas than their growth counterparts, Campbell and Vuolteenaho 
(2004) find that value stocks have considerably higher cash flow betas (bad betas) than growth 
stocks to support the risk-based explanation. This is replicated by Cohen et al (2009). Adrian and 
Franzoni (2008) use unobservable long-run changes in risk factor loadings via Kalman filter betas 
to disprove mispricing in favor of the risk-based explanation. Campbell et al. (2010) replicate 
Campbell and Vuolteenaho’s (2004) finding but add a caveat that VAR results are sensitive to the 
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particular VAR specification that is used. Campbell et al’s. (2010) second alternative VAR 
specification reveals that growth stocks’ cash flows have higher bad betas too. This caveat is a 
response to Cohen and Zhang (2009) who find that for most forecasting in variable specifications, 
value stocks do not usually have higher betas. They find the results of VAR models to be 
sensitive to the state variables used in the analysis. Thus Cohen and Zhang (2009) suggest 
limitation of using the cash flow and discount rate approach to draw meaningful conclusions as 
contradictory conclusions can be drawn, depending on whether the residual news represents the 
cash flow, or discount rate news. This weakens the risk-based explanation. It must be noted also 
that cash flow for direct property, as proxied by rent, is more certain than stocks’ cash flow. 
Although Plazzi et al. (2008) find that the cross-sectional dispersions of commercial real estate 
returns are counter-cyclical (see also Ghysels, 2007), such dispersions are not peculiar to real 
estate – they are true of most stocks and thus, do not detract from the relative certainty of rent 
compared to stocks’ cash flow. Furthermore, Plazzi et al. (2008) and Ghysels et al (2007) deal 
with commercial real estate as an entity rather than value versus growth commercial real estate. 
Similarly, Plazzi et al’s (2010) findings that commercial real estate’s expected returns and 
expected rent growth rates are time varying and that cap rates forecast the expected returns for 
some commercial real estate relate to both value and growth commercial real estate – Their paper 
does not address the real estate value premium anomaly.  
 
Cohen and Zhang’s (2009) findings agree with Lakonishok et al. (1994), MacKinley (1995), La 
Porta et al. (1995, 1997), Daniel and Titman (1996) that risk-based explanations do not provide a 
credible rationale for the observed return behavior (see Jaffe et al. 1989; Chan et al. 1991; Chopra 
et al. 1992; Capaul et al. 1993; Dreman and Lufkin 1997; Bauman et al. 1998, 2001; Nam et al. 
2001; Gomes et al. 2003 and Chan and Lakonishok 2004; Davis and Martin, 2008).  
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In contrast to the risk-based explanation, the behavioral finance paradigm recognizes 
psychological influences on human decision-making in which experts (including analysts and 
investors) tend to focus on, and overuse, predictors of limited validity (i.e. earnings trend in the 
recent past) in making forecasts (see Covel and Shumway, 2005; Slovic, 2001; Qian, 2008). The 
impact of recent past data on decision making is in accordance with Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982:416) who state that people appear to make predictions on the basis of a simple matching 
rule: “The predicted value is selected so that the standing of the case in the distribution of 
outcomes matches the standing in the distribution of impressions”. Moreover, Qian (2009) find 
that analyst forecasts, though time-varying, exhibit optimism which is not significantly affected 
by macroeconomic factors – It is rather affected by time-varying investor sentiments measured by 
2 Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) put-call ratios, and the cross-sectional skewness in 
the forecast errors. In view of systematic errors in investors’ expectations and analysts’ forecasts, 
it is argued that a significant portion of value stocks’ superior performance is attributable to 
earnings surprises (see De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta, 1996; 
Chan et al., 2000, 2003; Chan and Lakonishok, 2004; Jegadeesh et al., 2004). According to 
Dreman and Berry (1995) and Levis and Liodakis (2001), positive and negative earnings 
surprises have asymmetrical effect on the returns of value and growth stocks. Positive earnings 
surprises have disproportionately large positive impact on value stocks while negative surprises 
have relatively benign effect on such stocks (see also Bauman and Miller 1997). 
 
Furthermore, analysts and institutional investors may be motivated by self-interest to gravitate 
towards growth stocks – Analysts recommend successful (growth) stocks to generate trading 
commissions and more investment banking business (see Kothari, 2001; Michaely and Womack, 
1999; Lim, 2001). Moreover, growth stocks are typically in ‘promising’ industries, and are thus 
easier to promote in terms of analyst reports and media coverage than value stocks (Bhushan 
1989; and Jegadeesh et al. 2004). Another important factor is that most investors have shorter 
time horizons than are required for value strategies to consistently pay off (De Long et al. 1990; 
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Shleifer and Vishny 1990). In addition, institutional investors act in a fiduciary capacity. Pension 
fund trustees, in particular, are expected to behave as an “ordinary man of prudence”. This 
implies that they must go with the crowd (i.e. opt for glamour stocks). The result of all these 
considerations is that value stocks/glamour stocks become under-priced/overpriced relative to 
their fundamentals. Due to the limits of arbitrage, underreaction and overreaction to positive and 
negative news (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Phalippou, 2007; Pepelas, 2008), the mispricing 
patterns can persist over long periods of time. Moreover, MacKinnon and Al Zaman (2009) find 
that returns to direct real estate are mean reverting while risk decreases with investment horizon. 
This implies that growth/value portfolios, which have performed well/poorly in the recent past, 
are likely to perform poorly/well in the future medium and long investment horizons. 
 
In view of the above discourse, it is hypothesized that: 
a) value office  and retail properties generate higher returns than their growth counterparts;  
b) value office and retail property premium is a compensation for risk; and 
c) investors naively extrapolate past performance into future expectations. 
 
These hypotheses will be operationalized through statistical tests. 
 
Data Sourcing and Management 
The paper uses the Jones Lang Lasalle Real Estate Intelligence Service-Asia (JLL REIS-Asia), 
the Property Council of New Zealand, the Property Council of Australia and NCREIF property 
databases to classify 73 office property sub-markets and 48 retail property sub-markets into 
value/growth sub-markets on the basis of yield (Details are obtainable from authors), i.e. E/P ratio 
which is widely used in the finance literature for such classification.  
 
JLL REIS-Asia dataset consists of ex post quarterly (since 1994) and ex-ante annual (forecasts for 
the next 4 years) capital and rental values of prime commercial properties for 16 Asia real estate 
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market sectors (i.e. eight retail sectors and eight office sectors). The capital and rental values of 
commercial real estate assets (office and retail) in the eight cities are based on a basket of 30 
prime commercial buildings per sector in each city. Rental values are based on actual rents while 
the capital values are based on transactions and valuation estimates.  
 
The JLL REIS-Asia ex ante data are derived from JLL’s proprietary quantitative forecasting and 
the consensus views of the JLL network of branch offices in Asian cities, namely: Singapore (the 
Raffles Place CBD), Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong (the Central & major business districts), 
Bangkok, Manila (Makati CBD), Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. The criteria for selecting investment 
grade offices for the dataset are the same for all the markets in the sample. Thus, the dataset 
provides a basis for comparing like with like. Similarly, the data from the Property Council of 
New Zealand and the Property Council of Australia are based on market rentals and valuations. 
The quality of these data is attested by the fact that they have been subsumed by the IPD. All the 
datasets are extensively used by researchers. The only caveat about the use of different datasets is 
that one cannot guarantee that the quality is the same across all the datasets. However, the 
datasets are of very good quality to provide credible results. 
 
The other classification methods discussed in the literature review are not used to classify the data 
into value/growth properties because of the dearth of information on these accounting measures 
of classification. This is not a serious handicap as the finance literature shows that the results of 
studies based on these classification methods confirm, rather than contradict, the research results 
based on the E/P classification. The data for the office property market are from 1985Q1 to 
2005Q3 while the retail property market data are from 1992Q1 to 2005Q3.  The study period is 
constrained by access to data.  
 
The initial yields are measured in U.S. dollars. Decile portfolios are formed on the basis of the 
end-of-previous-quarter’s initial yield. The top decile of the sample with the highest initial yield 
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is classified as value property (Vp) portfolio while the bottom decile with the lowest initial yield 
is classified as growth property (Gp). Each decile is treated as a portfolio composed of equally 
weighted properties. The portfolios are reformulated only at the end of each holding period. This 
system of classification is consistent with the finance literature (see for example, Chan et al. 1991; 
and Bauman et al., 1998, 2001). 
 
The classification of the property sub-markets into Vp and Gp portfolios is followed by an 
examination of the relative performance of the portfolios. Time-varying risk and conditional 
market regression analyses are then conducted to ascertain the plausibility of the risk-based 
explanation for the value premium. This is followed by the naïve extrapolation test in an attempt 
to find an alternative explanation for the value premium.  
 
 
 
The Value Strategy Model  
 
The performance of both the value and growth properties for the office sector are compared on a 
5-year, 10-year, 15-year and entire holding-period (of up to 83 quarters) horizons while those for 
the retail sector are compared on 5-year, 10-year and entire holding-period (of up to 55 quarters). 
Medium and long term investment horizons are the focus of analyses as real estate investors 
usually invest long (Ball, 1998). Periodic (i.e. quarter-by-quarter) return measure is used in the 
evaluation of the relative superiority of the performance of Vp and Gp portfolios. The periodic 
returns are quantified as simple holding period returns. Thus, the simple holding period returns 
are calculated for each quarter and compounded to obtain the multi-year holding-period (e.g. 5-
year investment horizon) returns as defined in equation (1). 
      11...11 21  mt rrrr  (Levy, 1999),     (1) 
where 
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r1, r2…rm = return for each quarter of the period m. 
m             = number of quarters for the holding period.  
 
Equation (1) is more accurate than simply adding the returns for all quarters of a given period 
(Sharpe et al. 1998). However, Campbell et al. (1997) argue that this method of approximation 
may break down if the volatility of returns is critical – Simple compounding returns may 
exaggerate the performance of asset returns. Hence, Campbell et al. (1997) propose continuous 
compounding for modeling the behavior of asset returns over time.  
)1log(...)1log()1log()( 11   ktttt RRRkr  (Campbell et al., 1997)    (2) 
 
where, 
tR , 1tR  … 1 ktR  refer to the quarterly returns for each period. 
 
Therefore, the holding period returns for the paper are log returns (i.e. continuously compounded 
returns) based on Equation (2). The difference between the average returns for the value and the 
growth portfolios constitutes each period’s value-growth spread. A positive value-growth spread 
indicates superiority of value investing. 
  
The pooled-variance t test and separate-variance t test are then used to determine whether there is 
a significant difference between the means of the Vp and Gp portfolios. If the p-value is smaller 
than the conventional levels of significance (i.e. 0.05 and 0.10), the null hypothesis that the two 
means are equal will be rejected: 
growthvalueH  :0   
growthvalueH  :1  
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The next step is to determine whether any difference in returns is a function of variation in risk. 
Traditional measures of risk such as standard deviation of returns and risk-to-return ratio (i.e. 
coefficient of variation – CV) are first employed for the analysis. This is followed by time-
varying risk analysis. 
 
The Levene’s Test is used to test the equality of the variances for the value and growth properties:  
growthvalueH
22
0 :    
growthvalueH
22
1 :    
 
 
Expected Market Risk Premium Model 
This section is motivated by Petkova and Zhang (2005) who use two methods to study the time-
varying risk of value and growth portfolios: a simple sorting procedure and a more formal testing 
procedure based on conditional CAPM. The simple sorting procedure uses the correlation of 
conditional portfolio betas with the expected market risk premium to verify the time-varying risk 
explanation for the value premium. We therefore calculate the correlation between the market 
excess returns and conditional betas for the office and retail value and growth portfolios. In 
addition, we estimate the expected market risk premium via a least square regression of market 
returns and the observed value-growth spreads for different holding periods as follows: 
ittitit VGSRM  

 )(1         (3) 
where, 
1tRM    refers to the total market return from period t to t+1 
it

   refers to the estimated market risk premium 
tVGS   refers to the value-growth spread for holding period t 
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Hence, it


 is an estimate of the risk attached to the value-premium in each time period. This 
market risk premium forms the basis for classifying the sample periods into four economic states. 
The rationale for this classification is that periods with relatively high market risk premium ( it

 ) 
should be considered as a more volatile economic state. Therefore, the periods with the highest 
quartile of the market risk premium are classified as the worst state (trough), the second highest 
quartile is classified as the next worst (recession), the third highest quartile as the next best 
(expansion) and the lowest quartile as the best state (peak). The market on which the above 
classification is based is proxied by Datastream Indices (a composite of REITs and publicly 
traded real estate stocks) for the Pacific Basin Real Estate Stock Market from 1985Q1 to 2005Q3. 
The choice of any real estate stock market for this analysis is controversial as there is no single 
market that perfectly mirrors the Asian, Australian, New Zealand and US markets. However, 
given that the study focuses on US and Asia Pacific, the chosen market appears to be the best 
available proxy which may be an “inevitable” limitation of the study. 
 
We then calculate the two conditional betas: the rolling and the fitted betas of the value-growth 
portfolios for the full sample as well as for each of the economic states. This is repeated for the 
respective holding periods for both office and retail portfolios. 
 
The rolling beta is calculated via least square regressions of the value-growth premia on the 
market excess returns using a 20 and 40-period (quarters) moving-average rolling window for 
both office and retail portfolios, and a 60-period moving-average rolling window for the office 
portfolio (Eq. 4). The US Treasury Bill rates are used to calculate the market excess returns as the 
returns are denominated in the US dollar.  
iitttiit mTBmRMbmVG    )( 11      (4) 
 
where, 
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tmVG    refers to the moving average value-growth spread 
1tmRM   refers to the moving average market return from period t to t+1 
tmTB  refers to the moving average 1-year US government bond rate 
1b   refers to the estimated rolling-beta 
 
The fitted-beta is calculated via least square regressions of the market excess returns on various 
economic and real estate conditioning variables such as rental yields, the value-growth spread, the 
term-spread between US government  10-year bond yield and the 1-year US government bond 
rate and the US Treasury Bill rate. The rolling windows used for calculating the fitted-beta are the 
same as those for the rolling beta. 
 
iiittitititiiiit mTBbmTMbmVGbmRRbmRME   4321    (5) 
and 
 
titititiiit mTBbmTMbmVGbmRRbb 43210       (6) 
where, 
tmRME  refers to the moving average market excess returns 
tmRR   refers to the moving average mean rental yields 
tmVG    refers to the moving average value-growth spread  
tmTM   refers to the moving average term-spread 
tmTB  refers to the moving average US Treasury Bill  rate 
 
it  in Eq. 6 is the fitted beta.  
 
The rolling and fitted betas for the value-growth portfolios are calculated for the different 
economic states to observe any variation across good and bad times. Higher conditional betas 
during bad economic times relative to good economic times imply that the portfolio betas covary 
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positively with market risk. This would provide evidence that time-varying risk could be the 
explanation for the value-premium. 
 
The above analyses are supplemented with further examination of the beta-premium sensitivity 
via the generalized method of moments (GMM). If the value strategy exposes investors to greater 
downside risk, the value beta-premium sensitivity will be positive (see Petkova and Zhang, 2005). 
This is tested by regressing the conditional betas of value portfolios on the expected market risk 
premium to estimate in Eq. (7). The economic and real estate variables [ tttt
TBTMVGRR ,,,
] 
as well as a constant term are the vector of instrumental variables for the estimation equation 
below. 
 
ivtttivt mTBmRMmRME    )( 1       (7) 
 
where, 
  refers to the beta-premium sensitivity 
 
It follows from the above discourse that if the growth strategy is safer than the value strategy, the 
growth beta-premium sensitivity will be negative. The one-sided null hypothesis for the value 
portfolios is  >0. It is also tested whether the beta-premium sensitivities for growth portfolios 
are negative (i.e. Ho:  <0) and whether value-minus-growth portfolios have positive beta-
premium sensitivities.  
 
In an environment with time-varying risk, the conditional CAPM (CCAPM) is a natural 
benchmark for asset pricing. We therefore supplement the above analyses with a more formal test 
premised on CCAPM. If CCAPM can explain the value premium anomaly, the intercepts of 
value-growth portfolios must equal zero in conditional market regressions. 
 
Empirical Model Estimation – A Test of the Extrapolation Model  
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Following the evaluation of the risk characteristics of the Vp and Gp portfolios, the next task is to 
investigate the relationship between the past, the forecasted, and the actual future growth rates. 
This relationship is largely consistent with the predictions of the extrapolation model that 
investors are excessively optimistic about growth properties and overly pessimistic about value 
properties. A direct test of extrapolation (Lakonishok et al. 1994), then, is to compare the actual 
future rental income and capital growth rates of value and growth properties to their respective 
past growth rates and expected growth rates as implied by their initial yields. Naïve extrapolation 
and expectational error exist if actual future growth rates fall short of past growth rates. 
 
Results – Performance of the Value Strategy  
 
Figures 1a-1d demonstrate the superiority of value strategy over growth strategy. The office value 
portfolios outperform their growth counterparts in 42 of the 64 and 35 of the 41, five and ten-year 
holding periods respectively (Figures 1a & 1b). Moreover, the value strategy registers 100% 
value premium for the 15 and more than 15-year holding periods. The mean value/growth office 
portfolio log returns for the 5, 10, 15 and more than 15 years holding periods are 60.38%/21.48%, 
119.29%/42.85%, 225.27/66.54% and 278.78/79.62% respectively (Table 1 – full details are 
obtainable from authors). Thus, a dollar invested in the value office property portfolio over the 
entire investment horizon earns, on average, 199.16% more than a dollar invested in the growth 
office property portfolio. 
 
 
Similarly, the value retail property portfolio records spectacular performance by registering 100% 
value-growth spread for the 10 and more than 10-year holding periods (Figure 2b). Over the 5-
year investment formation horizons, however, the value retail property portfolio outperforms its 
glamour counterpart in 29 of the 36 holding periods (Figure 2a). The mean value/growth retail 
property portfolio log returns for the 5, 10 and more than 10-year holding periods are 
Figures 1a-1d 
Figures 2a & b; Table 1 
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103.41%/45.38%, 197.20%/79.47% and 237.62%/110.90% respectively (Table 1 – full details are 
obtainable from authors). 
 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 2a that the mean value-growth spread for both office and retail 
portfolios increases with the length of the holding period. The value-growth spread for the office 
portfolio increases from approximately 39 basis points for 5-year holding period to 199 basis 
points for more than 15-year holding period. Similarly the value-growth spread for the retail 
portfolio increases from 58 basis points for the 5-year holding period to approximately 127 basis 
points for the more than 10-year holding period. This phenomenon may be attributable to under- 
and over-reaction to earnings news coupled with limits to arbitrage resulting from, among other 
things, impossibility of short selling in the direct real property market, and heterogeneity, 
illiquidity and fixed location of real property. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) observe that 
underreaction and momentum cause returns to have positive autocorrelation over the three to 
twelve months subsequent to portfolio formation. Similarly, Daniel et al. (1998) and Barberis et 
al. (1998) note that underreaction continues to have positive autocorrelation three  to twelve 
months after portfolio formation while overreaction has negative autocorrelation three to five 
years after portfolio formation. The interaction between the positive and negative autocorrelation 
over three to twelve months and three to five years respectively could be the reason why the mean 
value-growth spread is relatively low over the 5-year investment horizon. 
 
Furthermore, long-term reversals (Pepelas, 2008; De Long et al., 1990), i.e. negative 
autocorrelation over the longer term, cause the value-growth spread to vary positively with the 
length of the investment horizon (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985). The peculiar characteristics of real 
property and the market in which it is traded (localized, presence of unsophisticated investors to 
give rise to noise-trader risk [De Long et al., 1990], etc.), together with property investment 
often being over the long term, significantly militate against arbitrageurs to prolong the 
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overreaction effect(s) over long investment horizons (De Long et al., 1990). Thus, given 
long-term reversals and the limits to arbitrage (De Long et al., 1990; Pepelas, 2008), any 
mispricing in the property market resulting from overreaction or anything else could be 
exploited by value investors to reap substantial profits over long investment horizons. 
 
It is worth noting that the differences between the mean returns for the value and growth 
portfolios (i.e. the value premia) are statistically significant at both the 0.01 and 0.05 levels 
(Table 2a). Furthermore, while the differences between the variances for the value and growth 
portfolios are not statistically significant for 5-year (office and retail) and 10-year holding periods 
(office only), the differences are statistically significant for the remaining holding periods (Table 
2b). This may imply that the value strategy is riskier than the growth strategy over long 
investment horizons (i.e. at least 10 and 15 years for retail and office respectively). This is 
confirmed by the coefficient of variation (Table 1) especially for the retail portfolios. The relative 
riskiness of the value strategy is examined via the beta premium (through the simple sorting 
procedure) and the beta premium sensitivity (i.e. time-varying risk of value strategies). 
 
 
 
 
Time-Varying Risk of Value Strategies: Beta-Premium 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of time-varying risk analyses of value strategies. The results do 
not generally support the time-varying risk hypothesis. It is true that the rolling and fitted betas 
vary across the four states of the economy but the betas do not generally have the expected sign 
(negative for peak and expansion; positive for trough and recession). The office rolling betas (5-
year holding period) for “expansion” and “peak” have a positive sign (instead of the expected 
negative sign), and statistically significant (Table 3a). This implies that the value premium is high 
at a time when market risk is low. Although the beta for “trough” is positive, that for recession is 
Tables 2a & b 
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negative but both are statistically insignificant. The corresponding fitted beta for “peak” is both 
countercyclical and statistically significant to support the time-varying risk hypothesis. However, 
it must be noted that the corresponding fitted beta for “trough” (though statistically insignificant) 
carries a negative sign to negate the risk-based explanation for the value premium anomaly. 
Furthermore, the fitted betas for the “recession” and “expansion” do not carry the correct signs 
which do not bode well for the time-varying hypothesis.  
 
 
The results for the 10 and 15-year holding periods for the office sector (Tables 3b & 3c) are 
virtually similar to those in Table 3a. The office rolling beta for “peak” over the 10-year 
investment horizon has the correct sign but the remaining rolling betas do not have the 
correct signs to support the risk-based hypothesis. Apart from the rolling beta for 
“expansion” (which is statistically significant albeit bearing the wrong sign) the betas are 
statistically insignificant (Table 3b). The corresponding fitted betas for “recession”, “expansion” 
and “peak” carry the correct signs to support the risk-based hypothesis but the negative sign for 
the “trough” beta contradicts the hypothesis. Moreover, all the betas are statistically insignificant 
(Table 3b). 
 
 
 
Over the 15-year holding period, the rolling betas for “expansion” and “peak” are countercyclical 
and statistically significant. This supports the time-varying risk hypothesis. It must be noted, 
however, that even though the rolling beta for “trough” carries the correct sign, that for 
“recession” does not – These betas are statistically insignificant. Unfortunately for the time-
varying hypothesis, all the office fitted betas for the 15-year holding period are negative. The 
negative beta (worrying sign for time-varying hypothesis) for “recession” is statistically 
significant while that for “expansion” (favoring the hypothesis) is also statistically significant 
(Table 3b). 
Table 3b 
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Similarly, the rolling and fitted betas for the retail sector (Tables 4a & b), especially for the 10-
year holding period, do not generally support the time-varying risk hypothesis. For example, the 
negative retail fitted betas for “trough” and “recession”, and the positive beta for “expansion” (all 
of which are very troublesome for the risk-based hypothesis) are statistically significant. Thus, 
the analyses of the value premium betas do not provide support for the time-varying risk 
hypothesis to be a credible explanation for the value premium anomaly. The discussion now turns 
to the beta-premium sensitivity to see if it will give credence to the risk-based hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Beta-Premium Sensitivity 
It is contended that if the value strategy exposes investors to greater downside risk, its beta-
premium sensitivity will be positive. Alternatively, the-beta premium sensitivity of the growth 
strategy will be negative. The beta premium sensitivities for both value and growth are reported 
in Tables 3 and 4. The results for both office and retail sectors are not favorable to the time-
varying risk hypothesis. An examination of Tables 3a-c shows that while the rolling beta 
premium sensitivities are positive for value and growth strategies, the fitted beta premium 
sensitivities are negative for both value and growth. Most of these sensitivities are not statistically 
significant. 
 
 
The results for the retail sector (Tables 4a & b) are even worse for the risk-based hypothesis. 
Once again, the rolling beta premium sensitivities are positive for both value and growth. 
However, while the value fitted beta premium sensitivities are negative (diametrically opposed to 
the risk-based hypothesis) for “trough” (both 5 and 10-year holding periods) and “peak” (5-year 
holding period), the growth fitted beta premium sensitivities are positive (another contradiction to 
the time-varying risk hypothesis) for “trough” (5 and 10-year holding periods) and “peak” (10-
year holding period). Moreover, while the rolling beta premium sensitivities for both value and 
Table 4a & b 
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growth are statistically significant for the 5- and 10-year holding periods, their fitted counterparts 
are not statistically significant for the 5-year holding period. The growth fitted beta premium 
sensitivities for the 10-year holding period are not statistically significant. However, the value 
fitted beta premium sensitivities for the 10-year holding period (although carrying signs that 
negate the risk-based explanation) are statistically significant.  These results show that risk may 
not be a credible explanation for the value premium anomaly. We further verify this through 
conditional market regressions (Ferson and Harvey, 1999). The intercepts for the conditional 
market regressions should be zero if CCAPM can explain the value premium. The results for the 
conditional market regressions are reported in Table 5. 
 
All the alphas (i.e. intercepts of the conditional regressions) in Table 5 are significantly greater 
than zero to imply that CCAPM cannot explain the value premium anomaly. This result is 
consistent with Petkova and Zhang (2005) and Lewellen and Nagel (2004). Furthermore, the 
above results concur with studies on stocks (e.g. Lakonishok et al., 1994; Brenan et al., 2004; 
Davis and Martin, 2008; Cohen and Zhang, 2009, to name a few), which conclude that the value 
premium is not driven by risk. We therefore explore the extrapolation model to ascertain the 
possibility of it being a credible provenance of the value premium. 
 
 
Post-Model Estimation – A Test of the Extrapolation Model  
 
This section provides empirical evidence to verify whether excessive extrapolation and 
expectational errors characterize growth and value strategies. First, the study period is divided 
into two: past (pre-portfolio formation) and future (post-portfolio formation) performances (see 
Panels B and C respectively of Table 6). Table 6 presents some descriptive characteristics of the 
growth and value portfolios with respect to their initial yields and past, and future, growth rates. 
Panel A of Table 6 reveals that the value portfolios have higher initial yields than growth 
portfolios. This is supposed to portend lower expected growth rates for value properties. Panel B 
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shows that the growth portfolio’s performance for both sectors (in relation to rental income) and 
for the retail sector (relative to capital value) is better than the value portfolios during the pre- 
portfolio formation period. On the other hand, Panel C shows that the relative growth of rental 
income and capital value for growth property portfolios is generally quite below expectation in 
the subsequent post-portfolio formation years.  
 
 
 
Given the Gordon’s formula (Gordon and Shapiro, 1956) the differences in expected rental 
growth rates can be directly calculated from differences in initial yields if discount rates are held 
constant. Thus, we seek to ascertain whether the large differences in initial yields between value 
and growth properties can be justified by the differences in future rental growth rates.  
 
Panel B of Table 6 reveals that the average quarterly growth rates for rental income for the 
glamour portfolio are 14.36% compared to 0.56% (office) and 17.40% compared to minus 1.87% 
(retail) for the value portfolio in the pre-portfolio formation period.  
 
Every dollar invested in the value portfolio in 1994Q2 (office) and 1997Q4 (retail) respectively 
has a claim to 8.57 and 12.22 cents of the corresponding rental income while a dollar invested in 
the growth portfolio has a claim to 1.69 and 1.75 cents of the rental income (Panel A of Table 6). 
Ignoring any difference in required rates of return, the large differences in initial yields have to be 
justified by an expectation of higher rental growth rates for glamour than for value portfolios over 
a period of time. Thus, the expected rental income for the growth portfolio must be higher than 
the value portfolio at some future date. Accordingly, investors are keen to know the number of 
quarters that it takes for the rental income per dollar invested in the growth portfolios (0.0169 and 
0.0175) to equate the rental income of the value portfolios (0.0857, and 0.1222), assuming that 
the differences in past rental income growth rates persist (i.e. the investments exhibit return 
Table 6 
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inertia). It takes approximately 12 quarters (office), and 11 quarters (retail) for such equalization 
to occur. This is good news for glamour investors as it takes just three years for their portfolios to 
catch up with, and outperform, value investors if return inertia persists. This fuels high growth 
expectations which are extrapolated too far into the future by glamour investors.   
 
Unfortunately, a comparison of Panels B and C (Table 6) show that the relatively higher expected 
future growth (implied by the higher growth rate and lower initial yield in the pre-portfolio 
formation period) in the glamour portfolios during the post-portfolio formation period is a far cry 
from reality. The actual post-portfolio formation rental growth rate for glamour portfolios 
plummets by 58.49% from 14.36% to 5.96% (office) and 79.02% from 17.4% to 3.65% (retail) 
per quarter. Conversely, the post-portfolio formation rental growth rate for the value portfolios 
increases by 8.93% from -0.56 to -0.51% (office), and 100.53% from -1.87% to 0.01% (retail). 
On the basis of the post-portfolio formation growth rates (Panel C of Table 6), it takes 28 quarters 
(7 years) and 56 quarters (14 years) for glamour office and retail portfolios respectively to catch 
up with their value counterparts. This implies that any underpricing, underreaction/overreaction 
persists for 7 years (office) and 14 years (retail) before being corrected. This persistence over 
long periods, coupled with compounding effects, may explain the time-varying nature of the 
value premium (i.e. why the value premium varies directly with the length of the holding period). 
These results are consistent with the overreaction/ naïve extrapolation model. Value/glamour 
investors are pleasantly/unpleasantly surprised by the post-portfolio formation results. Analysis of 
the capital values of the Vp and Gp portfolios yields somewhat similar results. 
 
During the pre-portfolio formation period, the capital value growth rate for the glamour retail 
portfolio (2.6%) is higher than the value retail portfolio (0.21%). The capital value growth rate for 
the office glamour portfolio (-2.14%), however, is lower than the office value portfolio (6.99%) 
during the pre-portfolio formation period (Table 6, Panel B). The results in Table 6 (Panel C) 
show that while the capital value growth rate for the retail glamour portfolio declines by 12.69% 
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from 2.6% to 2.27%, that for the value portfolio increases by 238.1% from 0.21% to 0.71% per 
quarter in the post-portfolio formation period.  Once again, the results are consistent with the 
extrapolation model. 
 
However, the results for the office portfolio capital value are inconsistent with the extrapolation 
model. The capital value growth rate for the glamour office portfolio increases by 156.54% from 
-2.14% to 1.21% while that of the corresponding value portfolio declines by 134.48% from 
6.99% to -2.41% per quarter. Thus, whereas the value office portfolios’ rental value growth rates 
support the extrapolation explanation for the value premium, its capital value growth rates do not 
support the extrapolation model. As far as the retail portfolios are concerned, the growth rates 
(both pre and post portfolio formation) for both rental and capital values support the extrapolation 
model to imply that extrapolation of past performance into the future is a credible explanation for 
the value premium. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The paper set out to investigate the comparative advantage(s) of the value and growth real estate 
investment strategies to ascertain the credibility of the risk-based explanation for the value 
premium (if any). The results of the study indicate that value portfolios for the two property 
sectors (office and retail) generally out-perform growth portfolios over all the holding periods 
under consideration. A dollar invested in the value portfolios over 10 years, on the average, earns 
76.44% (office) and 117.73% (retail) more than a dollar invested in the corresponding growth 
portfolios. Similarly, a dollar invested in the value portfolios over the entire period of study earns, 
on average, 199.15% (office) and 126.72% (retail) more than a similar investment in the growth 
portfolio.  The difference between the performances of the value and the growth portfolios are 
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statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, the value premium increases with the length 
of the holding period. 
 
Furthermore, the results of the time-varying risk analyses (based on the beta-premium and beta-
premium sensitivities) generally do not provide support for the risk-based explanation for the 
value premium anomaly. The results of the beta premium sensitivities analyses, in particular, 
generally contradict the time-varying risk hypothesis. This is supported by the results of 
conditional market regressions which show that CCAPM cannot explain the value premium 
anomaly. Given that the results are consistent with several studies on stocks, we cannot contend 
that the results are a function of the peculiar nature of real estate and the market in which it is 
traded. However, it may be noted that the peculiar nature of real estate (illiquidity, lumpiness, 
etc.) and the real estate market (market imperfection, impossibility of short selling and 
arbitraging, etc.) could lead to more expectational errors on the part of real estate investors than 
stock investors. This could be the reason why the results of the naïve extrapolation test generally 
indicate that overreaction/naïve extrapolation of past performance is a credible explanation for the 
superior performance of value real estate investment, especially for the retail real estate. 
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Figure 1a: Office value Premium (5-Year Holding Period) 
The figure displays the time-varying office value premia for the different 5-year investment horizons. 
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Figure 1b: Office Value Premium (10-Year Holding Period) 
The graph depicts the time-varying office value premia for the different 10-year holding periods. 
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Figure 1c: Office Value Premium (15-Year Holding Period) 
The graph depicts the time-varying office value premia for the different 15-year investment horizons. 
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Figure 1d: Office Value Premium (Holding Periods Exceeding 15 Years) 
The figure depicts the time-varying office value premia for the different holding periods exceeding 15 years. 
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Figure 2a: Retail Value Premium (5-Year Holding Period) 
The figure displays the time-varying retail value premia for the different 5-year investment horizons. 
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Figure 2b: Retail Value Premium (10-Year Holding Period) 
The figure displays the time-varying retail value premia for the different 10-year investment horizons. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Ln Return Statistics 
We report descriptive statistics for the value and growth portfolios for the office and retail sectors over their respective different holding periods. The 
statistics are: the mean ln return (column 3), standard deviation (column 4) and coefficient of variation (column 5).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Ln Return Statistics 
 
Sectors Holding Period 
Mean Return (%) Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation 
Value Growth Value Growth Value Growth 
Office 5 Years 60.38 21.48 42.83 42.73 0.71 1.99 
 10 Years 119.29 42.85 53.77 43.11 0.45 1.01 
 15 Years 225.27 66.54 45.84 17.28 0.20 0.26 
 > 15 Years 278.78 79.62 73.08 19.22 0.26 0.24 
        
Retail 5 Years 103.41 45.38 24.19 18.04 0.23 0.40 
 10 Years 197.20 79.47 47.16 15.55 0.24 0.20 
 > 10 Years 237.62 110.90 24.38 6.68 10.26 6.02 
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Table 2: Equality of Means/Variance Test 
We report test statistics for the equality of means return including value-growth spread (Table 2a) and their corresponding variance tests for value & growth portfolios.  
Table 2a: Equality of Means Test 
Sectors Holding Period Value-Growth Spread 
(%) 
t-test Test statistic t p-value   
Office 
5 Years 38.90 
Pooled-variance 5.02 0.000 Reject Reject 
 Separate-variance 5.02 0.000 Reject Reject 
 
10 Years 76.44 
Pooled-variance 7.10 0.000 Reject Reject 
 Separate-variance 7.10 0.000 Reject Reject 
 
15 Years 158.73 
Pooled-variance 14.85 0.000 Reject Reject 
 Separate-variance 14.85 0.000 Reject Reject 
 
> 15 Years 199.15 
Pooled-variance 12.08 0.000 Reject Reject 
 Separate-variance 12.08 0.000 Reject Reject 
        
Retail 
5 Years 58.02 
Pooled-variance 11.05 0.000 Reject Reject 
 Separate-variance 11.05 0.000 Reject Reject 
 
10 Years 117.73 
Pooled-variance 8.55 0.000 Reject Reject 
 Separate-variance 8.55 0.000 Reject Reject 
 
> 10 Years 126.72 
Pooled-variance 18.08 0.000 Reject Reject 
 Separate-variance 18.08 0.000 Reject Reject 
Table 2b: Equality of Variance Test 
Sectors Holding Period 
Standard Deviation 
F-test statistics p-value  
Value Growth 
Office 5 Years 42.83 42.73 1.00 0.490 Do not Reject Do not Reject 
 10 Years 53.77 43.11 0.64 0.080 Do not Reject Do not Reject 
 15 Years 45.84 17.28 0.14 0.000 Reject Reject 
 > 15 Years 73.08 19.22 0.07 0.000 Reject Reject 
 
        
Retail 5 Years 24.19 18.04 0.56    0.051 Do not Reject Reject 
 10 Years 47.16 15.55 0.11    0.000 Reject Reject 
 > 10 Years 24.38 6.68 0.08    0.000 Reject Reject 
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Table 3a: Office Beta-Premium Regression Results (5-Year Holding Period) 
The mean conditional rolling and fitted betas in the four economic states: Trough, Recession, Expansion and Peak for 
the Office Value minus Growth portfolios over the 5-Year holding period are presented in this Table. We use 20 
rolling-window regressions to estimate the rolling betas while the fitted betas are estimated via conditional market 
regressions using four conditioning variables: rental yields, value-growth spread,  term spread (difference between US 
government 10- and 1-year bond rates), and one-month US government Treasury Bill rate, and a constant. We also 
report Value and Growth beta-premium sensitivities, , with their standard errors for “Trough” and “Peak”, and for 
the entire period (i.e. all 4 economic states) as well as the Value minus Growth beta –premium sensitivity for the entire 
period. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for up to 20 quarters. 
 
 
Rolling Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Rolling Beta 0.0835 -0.1720 0.3138 0.3363 
Standard Error 0.0466 0.2814 0.9723 0.0365 
p-Value 0.0780 0.5432 0.0023 0.0000 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity  0.9643* 0.0190 0.9744* 0.0228 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity  0.9778* 0.0228 0.9622* 0.0328 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.90925 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.97515 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -0.2606 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
 
Fitted Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Fitted Beta -5.9638 4.4966 1.4614 -25.8967 
Standard Error 3.6562 1.8465 106871 7.3271 
p-Value 0.1081 0.7894 0.3964 0.0009 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Value -11.3020* 3.5094 -23.0497 12.8252 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Growth -8.0290 5.8093 -24.2677* 10.6487 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -7.76308 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -8.00005 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.23697 (p-Value: 0.0560) 
 
 
Note: 
For Value beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  >0 
For Growth beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  <0 
 
*Denotes statistical significance at both 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
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Table 3b: Office Beta-Premium Regression Results (10-Year Holding Period) 
We report the mean conditional rolling and fitted betas in the four economic states: Trough, Recession, Expansion and 
Peak for the Office Value minus Growth portfolios over the 10-Year holding period in this Table. We use 40 rolling-
window regressions to estimate the rolling betas while the fitted betas are estimated via conditional market regressions 
using four conditioning variables: rental yields, value-growth spread,  term spread (difference between US government 
10- and 1-year bond rates), and one-month US government Treasury Bill rate, and a constant. We also report Value 
and Growth beta-premium sensitivities,  , with their standard errors for “Trough” and “Peak”, and for the entire 
period (i.e. all 4 economic states) as well as the Value minus Growth beta–premium sensitivity for the entire period. 
The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for up to 40 quarters. 
 
 
Rolling Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Rolling Beta -0.2851 -0.2745 1.3187 -0.0056 
Standard Error 0.0650 0.2751 0.4784 0.0747 
p-Value 0.0001 0.3239 0.0085 0.9411 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Value 0.9980* 0.0397 0.8900* 0.0134 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Growth 0.9692* 0.0502 0.8981* 0.0131 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.73315 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.72593 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.007225 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
 
Fitted Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Fitted Beta -4.3353 3.1578 -0.7387 -9.6279 
Standard Error 4.0889 4.4243 3.2557 5.8701 
p-Value 0.2971 0.4795 0.8284 0.1123 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Value -2.1993 2.1401 -11.5048 6.9235 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Growth -2.2338 3.4549 -11.5405 6.9059 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -1.46373 (p-Value: 0.1660) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -1.48133 (p-Value: 0.2126) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.0176 (p-Value: 0.1444) 
 
 
Note: 
For Value beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  >0 
For Growth beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  <0 
 
*Denotes statistical significance at both 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
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Table 3c: Office Beta-Premium Regression Results (15-Year Holding Period) 
 
The mean conditional rolling and fitted betas in the four economic states: Trough, Recession, Expansion and Peak for 
the Office Value minus Growth portfolios over the 15-Year holding period are presented in this Table. We use 60 
rolling-window regressions to estimate the rolling betas while the fitted betas are estimated via conditional market 
regressions using four conditioning variables: rental yields, value-growth spread,  term spread (difference between US 
government 10- and 1-year bond rates), and one-month US government Treasury Bill rate, and a constant. We also 
report Value and Growth beta-premium sensitivities,  , with their standard errors for “Trough” and “Peak”, and for 
the entire period (i.e. all 4 economic states) as well as the Value minus Growth beta–premium sensitivity for the entire 
period. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for up to 60 quarters. 
 
Rolling Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Rolling Beta 0.1904 -0.7015 -0.9467 -0.1493 
Standard Error 0.2684 0.8209 0.4054 0.0264 
p-Value 0.4883 0.5432 0.0000 0.0000 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Value 0.855* 0.0265 0.6177* 0.0065 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Growth 0.8559* 0.0216 0.6174* 0.0012 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.569775 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.56905 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.000725 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
 
Fitted Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Fitted Beta -2.0934 -12.4878 -12.8989 -0.4347 
Standard Error 5.8189 4.2216 5.4093 1.0892 
p-Value 0.7236 0.0075 0.0271 0.3833 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Value -1.6847 2.2445 -1.7016 2.1030 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Growth -15.2386 7.8158 -3.1895 2.6014 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -9.86725 (p-Value: 0.2272) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -13.3647 (p-Value: 0.0872) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 3.49745 (p-Value: 0.0141) 
 
 
Note: 
For Value beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  >0 
For Growth beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  <0 
 
*Denotes statistical significance at both 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
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Table 4a: Retail Beta-Premium Regression Results (5-Year Holding Period) 
 
The mean conditional rolling and fitted betas in the four economic states: Trough, Recession, Expansion and Peak for 
the Retail Value minus Growth portfolios over the 5-Year holding period are presented in this Table. We use 20 
rolling-window regressions to estimate the rolling betas while the fitted betas are estimated via conditional market 
regressions using four conditioning variables: rental yields, value-growth spread,  term spread (difference between US 
government 10- and 1-year bond rates), and one-month US government Treasury Bill rate, and a constant. We also 
report Value and Growth beta-premium sensitivities,  , with their standard errors for “Trough” and “Peak”, and for 
the entire period (i.e. all 4 economic states) as well as the Value minus Growth beta–premium sensitivity for the entire 
period. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for up to 20 quarters. 
 
Rolling Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Rolling Beta 0.0364 0.0616 0.2516 -0.0345 
Standard Error 0.0338 0.0638 0.0979 0.0298 
p-Value 0.2894 0.3414 0.0166 0.2561 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.8630 1.3551 1.7617 1.9706 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Value Beta Premium Sensitivity  0.9538* 0.0190 0.9075* 0.0105 
Growth Beta Premium Sensitivity  0.9427* 0.0187 0.9090* 0.0100 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.46955 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.46780 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.00175 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
 
Fitted Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Fitted Beta -4.9406 -4.5225 -1.0163 -10.8569 
Standard Error 12.7883 5.2007 4.4388 6.3864 
p-Value 0.7018 0.3907 0.8170 0.1007 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Value -0.0865 4.1348 -15.8774 10.0766 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Growth 4.9550 9.2849 -73.8925 35.9476 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -3.16615 (p-Value: 0.45148) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -17.1603 (p-Value: 0.5034) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 13.99415 (p-Value: 0.2364) 
 
 
Note: 
For Value beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  >0 
For Growth beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  <0 
 
*Denotes statistical significance at both 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
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Table 4b: Retail Beta-Premium Regression Results (10-Year Holding Period) 
 
The mean conditional rolling and fitted betas in the four economic states: Trough, Recession, Expansion and Peak for 
the Retail Value minus Growth portfolios over the 10-Year holding period are presented in this Table. We use 40 
rolling-window regressions to estimate the rolling betas while the fitted betas are estimated via conditional market 
regressions using four conditioning variables: rental yields, value-growth spread,  term spread (difference between US 
government 10- and 1-year bond rates), and one-month US government Treasury Bill rate, and a constant. We also 
report Value and Growth beta-premium sensitivities, , with their standard errors for “Trough” and “Peak”, and for 
the entire period (i.e. all 4 economic states) as well as the Value minus Growth beta–premium sensitivity for the entire 
period. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation for up to 40 quarters. 
 
 
Rolling Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Rolling Beta -0.0227 0.1198 -0.0004 0.0415 
Standard Error 0.0729 0.1021 0.0071 0.0587 
p-Value 0.7591 0.2589 0.9598 0.5054 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Value 1.0004* 0.0217 1.0735* 0.0386 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Growth 0.9876* 0.0230 1.0678* 0.0359 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.52266 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.518064 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 0.0046 (p-Value: 0.0000) 
 
Fitted Beta 
  Trough Recession Expansion Peak 
Fitted Beta -16.8587 -10.9687 45.5541 94.3666 
Standard Error 4.5652 2.3811 10.3563 38.2366 
p-Value 0.0027 0.0006 0.00048 0.0902 
  Trough Std Error Peak Std Error 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Value -13.0144* 4.1934 67.3900** 25.9874 
Beta Premium Sensitivity Growth 15.1609 51.3596 63.2564 26.0712 
 
Value Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 20.09438 (p-Value: 0.0158) 
Growth Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is 26.50673 (p-Value: 0.2095) 
V-G Beta-Premium Sensitivity for all 4 States is -6.41235 (p-0.0699) 
 
 
Note: 
For Value beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  >0 
For Growth beta-premium sensitivity, Ho:  <0 
 
*Denotes statistical significance at both 0.01 and 0.05 levels. 
**Denotes statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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Table 5: Jensen’s Alpha from Conditional Market Regressions 
We present in this table the Jensen’s alpha () and standard error (se) from the conditional market 
regressions using four conditioning variables: rental yields, value-growth spread, term spread (difference 
between US government 10- and 1-year bond rates), and one-month US government Treasury Bill rate, and 
a constant which is the alpha. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of 
up to  20, 40 and 60 quarters respectively to the holding periods. 
   
Holding Period 
in Years 
Office Retail 
 Se  se 
5 2.0081 0.0865 2.7721 0.1551 
10 2.3348 0.0476 6.226.1 3.0421 
15 2.1309 0.0576 NA 
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Table 6: Initial Yield, Past & Future Performances of Value & Growth Property Portfolio 
The Table evaluates the overreaction/naïve extrapolation hypothesis to ascertain their credibility in explaining the 
superiority of the value portfolio. This is achieved through a comparison of the past and future (i.e. before and post-
portfolio formation) performances of value and growth portfolios vis-à-vis the respective initial yield at the end of the 
quarter preceding portfolio formation. The value and growth portfolios were formed in 1994Q3 (Office) and 1998Q1 
(Retail) which divide the periods under investigation into two equal halves. Panel A exhibits the initial yields while 
Panels B and C provide the past and future performances. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A (Office & Retail Portfolios formed at beginning of 1994Q3 & 1998Q1 respectively) 
Type Time Initial Yield 
 Value Growth 
Office 1994Q2 8.57 1.69 
Retail 1997Q4 12.22 1.75 
Panel B: Past Performance (Before Portfolio Formation) 
  Capital Rental Capital Rental 
Office 1985Q1-1994Q2 6.99 -0.56 -2.4 14.36 
Retail 1992Q1-1997Q4 0.21 -1.87 2.60 17.40 
Panel C: Future Performance (Post-Portfolio Formation) 
Office 1994Q4-2004Q2 -2.41 -0.51 1.21 5.96 
Retail 1998Q2-2004Q2 0.71 0.01 2.27 3.65 
